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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORATION 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
v. 
BETTY J. BLACK, individually 
and as personal representative 
of the estate of DON J. BLACK, 
and DON J. BLACK REALTY, INC., 
Defendants-Respondents 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CASE NO 16610 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Summary Judgment granted by 
the Honorable Christine M. Durham, Judge of the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and 
entered in the above entitled matter on July 2, 1979. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation, a Utah 
corporation ("Utah Mortgage"), seeks a reversal of the Judgment 
entered by the lower court pursuant to defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and reversal of the lower court's denial of 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Appellant 
further seeks remand of this case to the Third Judicial 
District Court for a full trial on the merits as to all 
unresolved issues. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 26, 1975, Betty J. Black, Don J. Black and~ 
J. Black Realty, Inc. ("Black Realty") executed and delivered 
to Utah Mortgage their Trust Deed Note in the prinicipal sum~ 
$675,715.00 evidencing a loan by appellant to the makers in 
that amount. (R. 2(,4), 9(,4) .) Payment of the promissory 
note was secured by a Trust Deed on certain real property 
located in Salt Lake County, Utah, which Mr. and Mrs. Black~ 
Black Realty were subdividing and developing. (R. 16.) 
The parties agreed that Utah Mortgage would release 
individual lots within the proposed subdivision upon its 
receipt of a pre-determined amount. Initially, this amount wa 
set at $5,200.00 but was subsequently raised to $5,500.00. ~. 
26(,26), 29, 30.) Typically, a buyer wishing to purchase o~ 
of the subdivision lots would pay the lot release price in~r 
escrow with the title insurance company at closing. The tit~ 
insurance company would then forward the release price to Ut~ 
Mortgage. Upon receipt of the release price, Utah Mortgage 
instructed the Trustee under the Trust Deed to execute a 
-2-
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partial release as to the particular lot. All of the sub-
division lots were released in this manner. (R. 30.) once all 
of the individual lots were released, a general Deed of 
Reconveyance was recorded describing the entire tract. 
(R.19.) 
Because of various cost overruns, delays, and 
unforeseen expenses, the amount required to complete the 
project, and the corresponding funds disbursed from the loan 
account exceeded the fair market value of the lots comprising 
the project. (R. 26 (,17).) 
According to the uncontradicted affidavit of Craig D. Anderson, 
one of Utah Mortgage's loan officers, the unpaid principal 
balance of the loan is $36,760.01. (R. 25 (112).) 
By a Complaint dated April 3, 1979, Utah Mortgage 
instituted the present action against Betty J. Black, Black 
Realty, and Betty J. Black as the personal representative of 
the estate of Don J. Black who died prior to the filing of the 
Complaint. (R. 2-3.) 
Defendants answered the complaint by alleging, inter 
alia, that plaintiff's action was barred by the "one-action" 
rule, § 78-37-1, Utah Code Annotated, and by the doctrines of 
estoppel, accord and satisfaction, and waiver. (R. 10.) 
-3-
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By a Motion for Summary Judgment dated June 19, 1979, 
defendants moved the District Court for summary judgment bas~ 
upon the aforesaid one-action rule. (R. 14-19.) Correspon-
dingly, by Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
dated June 21, 1979, plaintiff sought partial summary judgment 
as to the defenses raised in the Third, Fourth, Fifth and Si~· 
Defenses of Defendants' Answer. (R. 20.) By a Judgment dated 
July 2, 1979, District Court Judge Christine M. Durham grant~ 
defendants' Motion and denied that of plaintiff. (R. 68-69.) 
At the time of the hearing on the parties' Motions, counsel fu 
both plaintiff and defendants orally stipulated that notwith-
standing any language to the contrary in their respective 
motions, both motions were to apply to all defendants. (Id.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
----
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRl\NTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Although the lower court's Judgment does not specifY 
the reasons why it granted defendants' Motion for Summary 
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Judgment, the Motion itself, along with its accompanying 
Memorandum, makes it clear that the basis of the court's ruling 
was its finding that the "one-action rule", §78-37-1, Utah code 
Ann. (1953), barred plaintiff's action. In pertinent part that 
statute provides: 
There can be one action for the recovery of any 
debt or the enforcement of any right secured 
solely by mortgage upon real estate which action 
must be in accordance with provisions of this 
chapter ..•• 
In ruling that the above statute prevented plaintiff from 
seeking a judgment against the defendants on their promissory 
note, the court appears to have held that the fact that Black 
Realty and Mr. and Mrs. Black had agreed to release of the 
mortgaged property was irrelevant. The court also appears to 
have rejected Utah Mortgage's argument that its recovery on the 
promissory note could only be barred by the one-action rule if 
it were negligent in releasing the collateral. As more fully 
discussed below, the court's apparent adverse ruling as to 
these two issues was in error. 
A. THE ONE-ACTION RULE DOES NOT PRECLUDE JUDGMENT 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS BECAUSE THEY AGREED TO RELEASE OF 
THE COLLATERAL 
As stated, the uncontradicted affidavit of Craig D. 
Anderson makes it clear that all three defendants agreed to the 
lot release program under which Utah Mortgage released 
-5-
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piecemeal-fashion all of the property described in the Trust 
Deed. Furthermore, the Trust Deed itself which was signed 0~ 1 
by Black Realty provides, in part: 
. 4. At any time and from time to time upon 
written request of Beneficiary [Utah Mortgage], 
payment of its fees and presentation of the Trust 
Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full 
reconveyance, for cancellation and retention), 
without affecting the liability of any person for 
the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, 
Trustee may . . (d) reconvey without warranty, 
all or any part of said property. (R. 17.) 
The effect of a debtor's consent to release of 
collateral on the operation of the one-action rule has not beer 
clearly defined by this court. Indeed, in the five western 
states which have adopted the one-action rule, Utah, 
California, Idaho, Nevada and Montana, only the courts of 
California appear to have considered this issue. Thus, in 
Cooper v. Burch, 3 Cal. 470, 86 P. 719 (1906), the California 
Supreme Court held that where a co-signer on a promissory note 
secured by a mortgage on real property was neither informed of 
nor had consented to partial releases of the mortgaged 
property, the holder of the note could not obtain personal 
judgment against him on the note. 
Conversely, in Mono Irrigation Company v. State, 32 
Cal. 194, 162 P. 647 (1916) the court held that a creditor's 
sale of personal property described in a chattel mortgage prio' 
-6-
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to foreclosure as permitted in the mortgage instrument did not 
bar the creditor from seeking personal judgment on the note for 
any deficiency after the sale. The court there said: 
Thus, perhaps, if one having a debt secured by a 
mortgage should cancel it of record, without the 
consent of the mortgagor, it might be held he 
could not bring a personal action. On the other 
hand, if such mortgage were cancelled with the 
consent or at the request of the mortgagor without 
any intention of cancelling the indebtedness .•• 
the holder of the indebtedness would not be at all 
prevented by [the one-action rule) from bringing 
and maintaining a personal action for the amount 
due. Id. at 648-649. 
The rule in Utah appears to be consistent with that of 
California. Thus, in Donaldson v. Grant, 15 Utah 231, 49 P. 
779 (1897), this court said: 
(W]hen the mortgagee by his own act or neglect 
deprives himself of the rights to foreclose the 
mortgage, he at the same time deprives himself of 
the right to an action on the note. Ee is not 
permitted, without the consent of the mortgagor, 
to release the mortgage for the purpose of 
bringing an action upon the note. 15 Utah at 241, 
49 P. at 781. (Emphasis added). 
In view of the fact that prior to the advent of the 
Uniform commercial Code the one-action rule applied both to 
real and personal property, perhaps the clearest statement of 
Utah law as to the effect of a consent to release of collateral 
securing payment of the note is found in §70A-3-606(1), Utah 
Code Ann. ( 19 53) , which provides: 
-7-
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The holder discharges any party to the instrument 
to the extent that without such party's consent 
the holder 
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the 
instrument given by or on behalf of the party or 
any person against whom he has a right of 
recourse. (Emphasis added.) 
Similarly, analogous common-law doctrines in guaran~ 
and surety law also point to the conclusion that in agreeing tc 
release of the mortgage property, the makers of a promissory 
note lose the protection of the one-action rule in the event of 
a subsequent action on the note. Thus, concerning the effect 
of release of security as to a guarantor, it has been stated: 
Where the creditor, having had other security for 
payment of the debtor's obligation, releases or 
diverts that security, the guarantor is generally 
discharged to the extent of the value of the 
collateral released or diverted ..•. There are, 
however, exceptions to the general rule stated 
above. If the guarantor consented to the 
discharge of the security, he is not released. 38 
Arn. Jur.2d Guaranty §84. 
Similarly, it is well-established that release of 
security by a secured creditor acts as a prorata discharge of 1 
surety unless he consented to the release. Chicago Bridge ~ 
Iron Co. v. Reliance Insurance Co., 46 Ill.2d 522, 264 N.E.~ 
134, 136 (1970); Walin v. Young, 181 Ore. 185, 180 P.2d 535, 
537 (1947). 
-8-
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Finally, defendants' consent to release of the 
collateral acts as a waiver of their defense under the 
one-action rule. As to the doctrine of waiver this court has 
said 
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right. To constitute a waiver, there must 
be an existing right, benefit, or advantage, a 
knowledge of its existence, and an intention to 
relinquis~ it. It must be distinctly made, 
although it may be expressed or implied. Phoenix 
Insurance Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 194, 61 P.2d 
308, 311-312 (1936); American Savings & Loan 
Association v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 292, 445 
P.2d 1, 3 (1968). 
It will be seen that the elements of waiver described 
in the above decision are present here. The Blacks and Black 
Realty intentionally relinquished their right to prevent 
release of the collateral. Their relinquishment of this right 
was distinctly made. Thus they cannot now be heard to disclaim 
the negative effects of their agreement. 
It should be remembered that all of the loan proceeds 
were used for the benefit of the defendants. Similarly, the 
proceeds from the sale of the individual lots were used to 
reduce the indebtedness owed to Utah Mortgage. Mr. and Mrs. 
Black and Black Realty agreed to the lot release program which 
ultimately resulted in release of the security. Under such 
circumstances it would be both inequitable and contrary to 
-9-
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well-established principles of law to prevent Utah Mortgage 
from recovering the unpaid balance of the loan from the 
defendants. 
B. THE ONE-ACTION RULE DOES NOT PRECLUDE JUDGMENT 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS SINCE RELEASE OF THE COLLATERAL WA 
NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO PLAINTIFF'S NEGLECT OR FAULT 
Quite apart from the fact that in consenting to the 
release of the collateral defendants have waived any objectioo 
they might otherwise have had to the lot release program, it 
must also be recognized that Utah Mortgage's behavior was fr~ 
of the neglect or fault which has led courts to prevent 
recovery by a secured creditor where the collateral has been 
lost. 
Judicial interpretation of the one-action rule has 
made it clear that the rule requires exhaustion of the 
collateral before resort can be had against the maker of a 
secured note. Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Logan Lodge No. 
1453, B.P.O.E., 88 Utah 577, 56 P.2d 1046, 1049 (1936). 
However, the courts do not require a meaningless foreclosure 
action where the collateral has been previously lost or 
exhausted. Id. By contrast, if loss of the collateral is 
attributable to the culpable act of the secured party, the 
courts have refused to permit the creditor to recover any 
deficiency from the debtor. 
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The type of culpability necessary to bar a creaitor's 
recovery has not been clearly defined by the courts. In 
Donaldson v. Grant, supra, the court found that the failure of 
the assignee of the secured creditor to file timely notice of 
the assignment of a mortgage, thereby losing the priority of 
his lien, barred him from recovering a personal judgment 
against a co-maker. In ruling against the secured party, the 
court quoted with approval the following language from the 
California case of Merced Security Savings Bank v. Casaccia, 
103 Cal. 641, 37 P. 648 (1894): 
[T]he obvious purpose of the statute [i.e., the 
California one-action rule] is to compel one who 
has taken a specific lien to secure his debt to 
exhaust his security before having recourse to the 
general assets of the debtor. When he has done 
this, or when, without his fault, the security has 
been lost, the policy of the law does not prohibit 
a personal action. 15 Utah at 241, 49 P. at 781. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The court also quotes with approval a second California case, 
Hibernia Savings and Loan Society v. Thornton, 109 Cal. 427, 42 
P. 447, 448 (1895) wherein the court stated: 
But, when the mortgagee by his own act or 
neglect deprives himself of the right to foreclose 
the mortgage, he at the same time deprives himself 
of the right to an action on the note. Id. 
Whatever confusion may have been created by the "act 
or neglect" test of Donaldson v. Grant, ~, was eliminated 
-11-
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in Cache Valley Banking v. Logan Lodge, supra, where the court 
characterized Donaldson v. Grant as requiring fault. 
But it has also been held that, where the security 
has be~n lost throu~h n~ fault of the mortgagee, · 
an action may be ma1nta1ned directly upon the 
personal obligation evidenced by the note without 
going through the idle and fruitless procedure of 
foreclosure. Id. at 1049. (Emphasis added). 
As if to further emphasize the requirement of neglect 
or fault, the court in Cache Valley Banking further stated: 
He [the secured party] has not waived nor lost • 
[the security] by his negligence. It was lost 
by the fault of the mortgagor in not paying the 
first mortgage. Id. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, this court has described the type of behavior o: 
a secured creditor sufficient to bar his recovery of a persooi 
judgment in terms of "fault" (Cache Valley Banking v. Logan 
Lodge, Donaldson v. Grant) and "act or neglect" (Donaldson v. 
Grant). The question posed by the case at bar is whether the 
act of Utah Mortgage in instructing the Trustee under the TrITT! 
Deed to reconvey individual lots in accordance with its 
agreement with the defendants was the type of "fault" or "act 
or neglect" which should bar it from obtaining a personal 
judgment against the defendants. 
At the outset it must be recognized that the word 
"act" in the Donaldson v. Grant test of "act or neglect" does 
-12-
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not refer to every conceivable affirmative act of the creditor 
in releasing the collateral, but rather incorporates the 
concepts of neglect and fault. 
That not every act contributing to the release of 
collateral is subsumed within the expression "act" as used by 
the court in Donaldson v. Grant becomes clear when one examines 
the factual circumstances involved in the relevant Utah cases. 
Thus, in Donaldson v. Grant, the creditor was barred from 
recovery where he lost the priority of his lien by virtue of 
having neglected to record the notice of the assignment of the 
mortgage to himself. By contrast, in Cache Valley Banking Co. 
v. Logan Lodge, supra, the creditor was not barred from 
recovery where the earlier foreclosure of a prior mortgage had 
resulted in exhaustion of the collateral, nothwithstanding the 
fact that the creditor could have commenced his own foreclosure 
action prior to that of the first mortgage holder. 
The two cases illustrate the positive and negative 
aspects of the rule that the "act" of the creditor must contain 
the element of fault or neglect. Both involve an act (actually 
an omission) which resulted in loss of collateral. But only 
the "act" which was of a negligent character barred recovery on 
the note. Thus the court in Cache Valley Banking v. Logan 
Lodge explained that the creditor's lack of negligence, rather 
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than its failure to act, was the factor upon which the court 
relied in ruling in his favor. 
As noted above, the "act or neglect" test adopted in 
Donaldson v. Grant was actually taken from a California 
decision of Hibernia Savings and Loan Society v. Thornton, 
supra. California is also the state from whom Utah adopted 
one-action statute. It is therefore interesting to note that 
the California rule requires the element of fault. 
If a mortgagee cancels a mortgage of record 
without the mortgagor's consent he cannot then sue 
on the note on the loan as he would be permitted 
to do had the security become lost or valueless. 
On the other hand, a simple action on the note or 
debt is permissable where it appears that the 
security has, without fault of the ~ortgagee, been 
lost to him .•• 34 Cal. Jur.2d Mortgages §437, 
at 109. 
This formulation is virtually identical to that 
adopted in Idaho, Montana and Nevada. See Rein v. Callaway, 
Idaho 634, 65 P. 63, 64 (1901); Vande Veegaete v. Vande 
Veegaete, 75 Mont. 52, 243 P. 1082, 1084 (1928); McMillan v. 
United Mortgage Co., 82 Nev. 117, 412 P.2d 604, 606 (1966). 
It should be further noted that the rule barring 
recovery by a secured creditor whose own negligence or fault 
has resulted in loss of the collateral is nothing more than t 
negative formulation of the Uniform Commercial Code's requirE 
ment that a secured creditor exercise "reasonable care" as tc 
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collateral. §70A-9-207(1), Utah Cooe Ann. (1953). It is also 
closely analogous to the common law's imposition of a duty of 
"ordinary care" in cases not coming within the Code. First 
National Bank Giddings v. Helwig, 464 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex. 
App. 1971). 
In the instant case, it is clear that Utah Mortgage's 
actions in releasing the collateral were free of fault and 
neglect and that Utah Mortgage acted with reasonable care. 
These actions may be summarized as follows: (1) Utah Mortgage 
agreed with the defendants that it would release individual 
lots upon payment of a pre-determined amount (R. 26, 29)7 and 
(2) upon receipt of the release price, Utah Mortgage instructed 
the Trustee to execute a Deed of Reconveyance as to the 
particular lot. (R. 30.) 
To say that Utah Mortgage acted unreasonably or in a 
negligent manner in entering into the agreement with the 
defendants for partial releases of the collateral, is to admit 
at the same time that the defendants were themselves negligent 
in so agreeing. The more logical conclusion, however, is that 
plaintiff and defendants were acting in a reasonable manner at 
the time they entered into the agreement and that only in light 
of subsequent events can it be seen that the lot release price 
should have been set at a slightly higher level. In any case, 
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it is clear that the defendants were not precluded by the 
agreement from reducing the principal amount of the note by 
means of payments from their share of the purchase price of lli 
lots or from other sources. 
As to the reasonableness of Utah Mortgage's release [ 
the individual lots upon receipt of the release price, it ne~ 
only be observed that had Utah Mortgage refused to make such 
releases it would have thereby breached its agreement with 
defendants. Thus, if Utah Mortgage were negligent or acted 
unreasonably, it must be concluded that it is negligent or 
unreasonable to perform one's covenants under a contract. 
Furthermore, the fact that the total indebtedness of over 
$675,000 was reduced to less than $40,000 through the lot 
release program would appear to refute any allegation that lot' 
were negligently released. 
In conclusion, it should be observed that permitting 
Utah Mortgage's recovery would not violate the policy under-
lying the one action rule. The policy of the rule has been 
expressed as follows: 
The purpose of the statute is dual. One is to 
protect the mortgagor against multiplicity of 
actions when the separate actions, though 
theoretically distinct, are closely connected that 
normally they can and should be decided in one 
suit. The other is to compel a creditor who has 
taken a mortgage on land to exhaust his security 
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before attempting to reach any unmortgaged 
property to satisfy his claim. G. Osborne, 
Mortgages §334, at 700-701 (2d ed. 1970). 
In this case the policy against multiplicity of 
actions is not violated by this action since the release of the 
collateral precludes any possibility of a separate foreclosure 
action. Correspondingly, the policy requiring resort to the 
collateral before any personal judgment can be sought would not 
be violated since the property has already been sold and the 
proceeds therefrom either distributed to the defendants or 
applied against the defendants indebtedness. It follows that 
the one-action rule does not bar this action. 
POINT II 
THE ONE-ACTION RULE DOES NOT BAR PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM 
AGAINST MR. AND MRS. BLACK BECAUSE THEY WERE SURETIES 
As noted above, the practical effect of the one-action 
rule is to require the creditor to exhaust the collateral as a 
prerequisite to any recovery directly from the debtor. 
However, the rule has no application to those who sign or 
indorse a note as sureties. Thus it has been stated: 
The Code requirement that there be but one form of 
action for recovery of. any debt or enforcement of 
any rights secured by a mortgage app~ies to ~he 
primary debtor and was enacted for his benefit. 
The law never contemplated that because one has 
taken a mortgage he cannot take other independant 
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security for his debt and, if the contract for 
such security permits it, enforce such contract 
without reference to the mortgage debt. 34 Cal. 
Jur.2d Mortgages §429, at 98-99. 
Where, as here, some of the co-makers on a note are 
nothing more than sureties, the one-action rule does not 
require foreclosure on the mortgage securing payment of the 
note as a prerequisite to a personal action against the 
accommodation makers. 
[U)less there is some agreement or soecial 
circumstance imposing deligence on the creditor as 
a duty, he aoes not by mere failure to pursue the 
original debtor discharge a guarantor, surety, or 
indorser, though his passivity in this regard may 
result in barring his remedy against the original 
debtor. Accordingly, a creditor loses no rights 
against an indorser, whose liability has become 
fixed by a simple failure to enforce his lien 
against property mortgaged to secure the debt. 
Id. at 100. 
The reason for the above rule is clear: one who hu 
given security for the payment of a debt may reasonably expect 
that the creditor will look first to the security for satisf~ 
tion of the indebtedness. By contrast, one whose obligation i: 
secured by collateral belonging to a co-debtor is not injured 
if the creditor chooses to proceed against him directly instN 
of resorting first to the collateral. 
In addition, the undertaking of the surety is in the 
nature of additional collateral to the obligation of the 
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primary maker. If he defaults, the creditor may choose to 
waive the collateral and proceed directly against the surety on 
his separate contract of suretyship. Thus as to a suretyship 
in the form of a guaranty it has been held that a creditor may 
proceed directly against an absolute guarantor without first 
resorting to foreclosure of a mortgage or trust deed, even 
where the one action rule is in effect. First National Bank of 
Nevada v. Barengo, 91 Nev. 396, 536 P.2d 487 (1975); Coombs v. 
Heers, 366 F. Supp. 851 (D. C. Nev. 1973). 
follows: 
"Suretyship" is defined by the Restatement as 
Suretyship is the relation which exists where one 
person has undertaken an obligation and another 
person is also under an obligation or other duty 
to the oblige, who is entitled to but one 
performance, and as between the two who are bound, 
one rather than the other should perform. 
Restatement of Security §82 (1941) 
The co-maker of a note may be a surety. Miller v. 
Zeigler, 3 Utah 17, 5 P. 518 (1881). 
In the case at bar it is undisputed that Mr. and Mrs. 
Black and Black Realty signed the note. It is also apparent 
from the Trust Deed (R. 16) and the Deed of Reconveyance (R. 
19) that Black Realty was the fee owner of the mortgaged 
property. Thus Mr. and Mrs. Black appear to have signed the 
note as sureties for the obligation of Black Realty. 
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Correspondingly under the California rule described above, Mr,. 
Black, both individually and as executrix for her husband's 
estate has no standing to complain that the collateral which 
was supplied by her co-defendant, Black Realty, was negligenu 
disposed of. It follows that the one-action rule should not~ 
so construed as to bar Utah Mortgage's action against the 
Blacks, even if this Court were to decide that the action 
against Black Realty is precluded. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Consistent with its grant of summary judgment to 
defendants, the lower court denied Utah Mortgage's Motion fur 
Partial Summary Judgment as to the defenses of the one-action 
rule (Third Defense), estoppel (Fourth Defense), accord and 
satisfaction (Fifth Defense) and waiver (Sixth Defense). 
Since, as discussed above, the court ruled incorrectly when it 
granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment based upon tie 
one-action rule, it follows that this court should reverse n~ 
only the lower court's granting of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, but also its denial of Plaintiff's Motion fo· 
Partial Summary Judgment on the same issue. In addition, sine' 
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the facts as set forth in the various affidavits are uncontra-
dieted as to the doctrines of estoppel, accord and satisfaction 
and waiver, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as 
to these issues should have been granted and failure to so rule 
was reversible error on the part of the lower court. 
A. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING ITS 
CLAIM. 
Defendants assert in their Fourth Defense that 
plaintiff is "barred, precluded, and estopped by the terms of 
its Deed of Reconveyance . from asserting the claims and 
demands set forth herein." An examination of the facts in this 
case in light of the elements of estoppel as enunciated by the 
Utah Supreme Court shows clearly that defendants' assertion is 
without merit. 
The Utah Supreme Court has described equitable 
estoppel in the following terms: 
It is a doctrine of equity to prevent one party 
from deluding or inducing another into a position 
where he will unjustly suffer loss. As applicable 
here, the test is whether there is conduct, by act 
or omission, by which one party knowingly leads 
another party, reasonably acting thereon, to take 
such course of action, which will result in his 
detriment or damage if the first party is 
permitted to repudiate or deny his conduct or 
representation. Harvey v. Sanders, 534 P.2d 903, 
905 (Utah 1975). 
See also, 28 Am.Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 35. 
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In the case at bar the only conduct which defendants 
point to as giving rise to estoppel is plaintiff's reconveyaITT 
of the real property described in the Trust Deed which 
originally secured the promissory note sued upon. There has 
been no allegation made by defendants that plaintiff is 
attempting to "repudiate or deny his conduct or representa-
tion." Id. Similarly, defendants have not alleged that as a 
result of plaintiff's releasing of its lien they have taken 
some course of action resulting in detriment or damage to 
them. Indeed, the only evidence before this court is that 
defendants specifically agreed to release of the collateral. 
Thus, there could not have been any detrimental reliance on~ 
part of defendants giving rise to estoppel. Defendants' 
invocation of the doctrine of estoppel must therefore be 
rejected. 
B. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION. 
Defendants claim in their Fifth Defense that Utah 
Mortgage's claim is barred by the doctrine of accord and 
satisfaction. An examination of the authorities belies this 
assertion. The doctrine of accord and satisfaction has been 
described by the Utah Supreme Court in the following 
terminology: 
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An accord and satisfaction is a method of 
discharging a contract, or settling a claim 
arising from a contract, by substituting for such 
contract or claim an agreement for the satis-
faction thereof, and the execution of the 
substituted agreement. "To constitute an accord 
and satisfaction there must be an offer in full 
satisfaction of the obligation, accompanied by 
such acts and declarations as amount to a 
condition that if it is accepted, it is to be in 
full satisfaction, and the condition must be such 
that the party to whom the offer is made is bound 
to understand that if he accepts it, he does so 
subject to the conditions imposed. . •• The 
accord is the agreement and the satisfaction is 
the execution or performance of such agreement • 
• . •Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc., 
560 P.2d 1383, 1386 (Utah 1977) (Quoting 1 Arn. 
Jur.2d Accord and Satisfaction §1.) 
As shown by the affidavit of Craig D. Anderson, (R.26 
(•Bl.) Utah Mortgage has never agreed to substitution of the 
promissory note sued upon for any other obligation. Similarly, 
defendants have adduced no evidence to show that they ever made 
an offer "in full satisfaction of the obligation". Cannon v. 
Stevens School, supra. It is true that the Affidavit of Craig 
D. Anderson shows that there was a partial reduction of the 
indebtedness each time a subdivision lot was sold. (R.26 
(•9) .) However, as Mr. Anderson's Affidavit also shows, the 
proceeds from the sale of the lots never completely paid off 
the underlying indebtedness. Thus, there was only an "accord 
and satisfaction" to the extent of the proceeds from the sales 
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of the lots. Correspondingly, defendants' theory is without 
merit. 
C. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY WAIVER. 
Defendants assert in their Sixth Defense that "plai~ 
tiff is barred and precluded hy waiver from asserting the 
claims and demands set forth herein." As is the case with thE 
other theories discussed above, defendants' theory of waiver i 
not consistent with the law of this state. 
As noted above, this Court has defined waiver as an 
intentional relinquishment of a known right. 
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right. To constitute a waiver, there must 
be an existing right, benefit, or advantage, a 
knowledge of its existence, and an intention to 
relinquish it. It must be distinctly made, 
although it may be expressed or implied. Phoenix 
I~surance Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 194, 61 P.2d 
308, 311-312 (1936); American Savings & Loan 
Association v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289 292, 445 
P.2d 1, 3 (1968). 
As the affidavit of Craig D. Anderson makes clear, 
Utah Mortgage has never agreed to relinquish or dispense with 
its rights under the promissory note. (R. 26-27 (1111).) Thus 
there is no factual support for defendants' waiver theorv. 
The defe?nses of estoppel, accord and satisfaction, an: 
waiver are all affirmative defenses the burden of proof of 
which rests upon defendants. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c); 29 Am. 
Jur.2d Evidence §129. In the case at bar defendants have 
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failed to produce any evidence in support of the aforesaid 
theories; on the contrary plaintiff has produced affidavits in 
support of its Summary Judgment negating those defenses. It 
follows that plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as 
to the issues of estoppel, accord and satisfaction, and waiver 
should have been granted. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the defenses relied upon by defendants may be 
described variously in legal terminology as the "one-action 
rule", "estoppel and waiver" and "accord and satisfaction" they 
are all essentially variations on a central theme: namely, that 
plaintiff should not be entitled to recover against defendants 
since the loan collateral was insufficient to pay off the 
indebtedness. As demonstrated above, the legal authorities do 
not support defendants in this argument. In essence, what 
defendants are saying is that any loss on the project should be 
absorbed by Utah Mortgage, but that any profit should inure to 
them. While such an arrangement may be typical of a partner-
ship or joint venture, it is certainly anomalous to the 
relationship of a lender to a borrower. Defendants gambled on 
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the real estate market and lost. Now they should be requir~ 
to reimburse the lender who made their venture possible. 
t~ 
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